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Abstract
We propose a model of political competition and stability in nominally democratic societies
characterized by fraudulent elections. In each election, an opposition leader is pitted against
the leader in power. If the latter wins, he remains in power, which automatically makes him
the incumbent candidate in the next election as there are no term limits. If he loses, there is
an exogenously positive probability that he will steal the election. We model voter forward-
looking behavior, dening a new solution concept. We then examine the existence, popularity,
and welfare properties of equilibrium leaders, these being leaders who would remain in power
indenitely without stealing elections. We nd that equilibrium leaders always exist. However,
they are generally unpopular, and may be ine¢ cient. We identify three types of conditions under
which equilibrium leaders are e¢ cient. First, e¢ ciency is achieved under any constitutional
arrangement if and only if there are at most four competing leaders. Second, when there are
more than four competing leaders, e¢ ciency is achieved if and only if the prevailing political
system is an oligarchy, which means that political power rests with a unique minimal coalition.
Third, for a very large class of preferences that strictly includes the class of single-peaked
preferences, equilibrium leaders are always e¢ cient and popular regardless of the level of political
competition. The analysis implies that an excessive number of competing politicians, perhaps
due to a high level of ethnic fragmentation, may lead to political failure by favoring the emergence
of a ruling leader who is able to persist in power forever without stealing elections, despite being
ine¢ cient and unpopular.
Keywords: Fraudulent democracy, farsightedness, e¢ ciency, popularity, naiveté, political
failure, fragmentation.
1We thank Daron Acemoglu for useful discussions. Roland Pongou is a visiting scholar in the Department of
Economics at MIT, and acknowledges this institution for its hospitality.
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1 Introduction
Political rights have expanded to an unprecedented extent over the last century. Measures of
democratic political participation show impressive upward trends since 1900 (Acemoglu (2012)).
These trends are also observed in countries that achieved independence relatively recently. For
instance, between 1960 and 2010, African countries have held over 650 presidential and legislative
elections. Yet, despite this remarkable rise in political freedom, it is also recognized that democracy
continues to be weak in many parts of the world. In most less-developed regions, the majority of
democracies are su¤ering from the persistent problem of fraudulent elections. According to Freedom
House, the number of full electoral democracies in sub-Saharan Africa has fallen signicantly since
2005. In addition to manipulating elections, many political regimes have demonstrated a tendency
to manipulate their constitution to eliminate presidential term limits, thus making sure that their
leader is able to stay in power for "life." Power monopolization has also been observed at the party
level. In most African countries, many political parties have not renewed their leadership since
their creation following the wave of democratization that swept the continent in the 1990s, which
suggests that the leaders of these parties will try to conscate power if they eventually become
their countrys ruling leader.
In this paper, we propose a model of political competition and stability in a democracy that
is tainted by fraudulent elections. In a society of innitely lived individuals, elections are held at
regular intervals to choose a leader from a nite set of politicians under a xed constitution. In each
election, an opposition leader is pitted against the leader in power. If the latter wins, he remains in
power, which automatically makes him the incumbent candidate in the next election as there are
no term limits. If the opposition leader wins, there is an exogenously positive probability that the
election will be stolen by the incumbent regime. A victory by an opposition leader therefore does
not necessarily lead to a political transition.
Our goal in this paper is threefold. First, we model rational citizen behavior in this dynamic
environment, introducing a new solution concept for this class of games. Second, we study the
existence of equilibrium leaders, and third, we analyze their popularity and welfare implications.
Our analyses also have implications for the ways in which naive versus farsighted voting behavior
a¤ects the quality of equilibrium leaders.
In proposing a model of rational behavior, we answer the question of when a citizen will support a
challenger over the incumbent leader. In order to answer this question, we assume that each citizen
is farsighted or forward-looking, given the dynamic nature of the political process. This means
that the decision to support a particular candidate not only should be based on the immediate
benets that would ow from that candidate coming to, or remaining in, power, but also should
take into account future possible political transitions that would take place following the outcome
of the present election. Farsightedness therefore dictates two basic rules. A citizen will support
a challenger over the status quo only if: (1) he or she prefers the former to the latter; and (2)
the election of the challenger will not, following subsequent political transitions, lead to the rise to
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power of another politician who, from the point of view of this particular citizen, is worse than the
present-day status quo.
The rst rule takes into account the possibility that a newly elected leader might succeed in
staying in power indenitely by, for instance, manipulating future elections. An individual who
supports change over the status quo therefore should be motivated to do so. The second rule
incorporates two prescriptions. The rst postulates that, if there is a possibility that the election of
the challenger would lead to the rise of a worse leader following one or more subsequent transitions,
then a voter should not support him or her over the status quo. The second prescription is simply
the inverse of the rst and seeks to optimize individual decision making. It states that an individual
should support the challenger if the election of the latter would not lead to a worse leader relative
to the status quo. As a result, an individual who follows the two rules always acts optimally when
choosing between two candidates.
We model farsightedness as a binary relation over the set of political leaders. An equilibrium
leader is therefore a maximal element with respect to that binary relation. Intuitively, an equilib-
rium leader is a politician who, if elected and propelled to power at some point of the dynamic
electoral process, would be able to remain in o¢ ce indenitely without stealing elections. If a leader
is not an equilibrium, then there exists a rational path away from that leader.
We examine the existence of equilibrium leaders when citizens are farsighted and have common
knowledge of rationality. We nd that an equilibrium leader always exists if citizens have linear
preferences. However, equilibrium leaders can be unpopular in the sense of being less preferred by
a majority of the population than another leader. What makes an unpopular leader stable is the
fact that the leader who dominates him in terms of popularity is himself unstable. It follows that
the stability of an unpopular leader is guaranteed by the legitimate fear of some citizens that there
is a positive probability that change, following subsequent political transitions, would lead to an
outcome that is worse for them than the current status quo.
We also analyze the welfare properties of equilibrium leaders. We nd that an equilibrium leader
might be Pareto ine¢ cient. In fact, it might happen that voting against an ine¢ cient leader who is
in power today will lead to the election of an inferior alternative in the future, which is the reason
why ine¢ cient leaders are sometimes stable. We investigate conditions that guarantee the e¢ ciency
of equilibrium leaders. We identify three types of conditions. The rst is related to the number
of competing politicians, the second is related to the nature of the prevailing political system or
constitutional arrangement, and the third is related to the domain of preferences. More precisely, we
nd that e¢ ciency at any preference prole and under any constitutional arrangement is guaranteed
if and only if there are at most four competing politicians. If the number of politicians is greater
than four, e¢ ciency at any preference prole is achieved if and only if the prevailing political
system is an oligarchy, with decisive power being concentrated by a unique minimal coalition of
citizens. This minimal coalition may contain just one person, in which case the political system
is a dictatorship, or it may be the entire population, in which case the system is governed by the
unanimity rule. Furthermore, we analyze the e¤ect of preference domain restrictions on outcome
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e¢ ciency. We identify a very large class of preferences for which any equilibrium leader is e¢ cient.
This class of preferences was rst discovered by Salles (1976). It strictly includes the class of single-
peaked preferences and the class of single-carved preferences. Importantly, we also nd that, for
that class of preferences, any equilibrium leader is popular and any popular leader is an equilibrium
leader, which provides an unexpected condition under which leader stability and popularity coincide
within our framework.
The nding that the limitation of the number of competing politicians to a maximum of four
guarantees the e¢ ciency of equilibrium leaders was unexpected. The intuition underlying this result
is that a greater number of competing politicians creates more uncertainty about who will govern
the society in the future if the current ruling leader loses power. This uncertainty might sometimes
combine with voter prudence or forward-looking behavior to maintain the current leader in power.
If the number of competing leaders is su¢ ciently large, thus creating a high level of uncertainty
about the future, the current leader might be maintained in power even if he or she is ine¢ cient.
Although this explanation provides some insight into why a high level of political competition
might lead to political ine¢ ciency, the minimum level of competition that is necessary to lead to
this situation has yet to be determined. In this sense, the sharp threshold provided by our analysis
is a mathematical discovery.
Our analysis of the conditions that guarantee the e¢ ciency of equilibrium leaders seems to
indicate that e¢ ciency is achieved at the cost of violating well-accepted democratic principles,
such as capping the number of competing politicians at four2, or distributing political rights in an
inequitable manner. The analysis therefore has implications for the quality and longevity of ruling
leaders in fragmented societies. For example, societies that are organized around ethnic groups and
in which the number of political leaders reects the number of these groups might be more likely to
elect a stable but ine¢ cient leader, especially if there are more than four major ethnic groups. Such
a leader does not need to manipulate elections in order to remain in power, as his or her stability
is guaranteed by the political antagonism between the major ethnic groups in the country. This
suggests that the plethora of competing politicians and political parties that generally characterizes
ethnically fragmented societies partly explains the quality and political longevity of the ruling leader
of those societies. Drawing in part on the vast literature pertaining to the economic impacts of
ethnic divisions, our analysis reveals that another channel through which ethnic fragmentation can
lead to underdevelopment is its tendency to favor the emergence of bad leaders who are able to
persist in power indenitely without stealing elections.
Our analysis also has implications for how voting behavior a¤ects the quality of elected leaders.
In particular, we contrast voting outcomes under conditions of farsighted behavior and naive (or
myopic) behavior. Citizens vote myopically when they view each election as a one-shot game.
Surprisingly, we nd that such behavior always leads to equilibria that are e¢ cient and popular.
Indeed, a myopically stable leader is also a farsightedly stable leader, but the converse is not true in
2 Interestingly, our analysis implies that democracies that have only two major parties like the United States always
induce e¢ cient leaders, even if, unlike the United States, those democracies are characterized by fraudulent elections.
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general. In addition, given the fact that myopically stable leaders are also popular, it follows that
myopically stable leaders are the rst-best for society, and that farsightedly stable leaders who are
not myopically stable are the second-best. Our analysis therefore implies that individually optimal
behavior is in general detrimental to society, whereas behavior that leads to good outcomes for
society may be detrimental to the individuals who adopt it. Importantly, our identied class of
preferences for which equilibrium leaders are e¢ cient resolves this dilemma, as naive and farsighted
behaviors lead to the same set of stable leaders under those preferences.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 situates our study in the literature.
Section 3 introduces our model of a dynamic political economy characterized by fraudulent elections.
Section 4 models rational behavior and introduces a new solution concept. Section 5 studies the
existence of equilibrium leaders, and Section 6 examines their welfare properties and popularity.
Section 7 draws the implications of our analyses for the majority rule, which is viewed as the fairest
of all political rules (Dasgupta and Maskin (2008)). Implications for the longevity and quality of
leaders in ethnic societies are also provided. Section 8 contrasts voting outcomes under farsighted
and naive voting behaviors. Section 9 suggests a di¤erent application of our model to the selection
of sticky policies in fully developed democracies and concludes.
2 Closely Related Literature
Instances of electoral fraud across the world have been widely documented. However, we are not
aware of any prior theoretical analysis of how electoral fraud a¤ects voter rationality as well as the
stability and quality of political leaders in nominally democratic societies. In addition to supplying
a simple framework for analyzing this crucial question, our study has yielded testable implications
for how the level of political competition and certain social structures might lead to political failure
in fraudulent democracies. A key characteristic of such democracies is that, although an "o¢ cial"
constitution exists, it is respected only in case the ruling leader wins the election. If the ruling
leader loses, he will steal from the challenger with a positive probability, but this probability is not
known. The distinctive features of a fraudulent democracy are therefore its o¢ cial constitution
and the "unknown" probability with which the constitution is respected by the ruling leader. It
is these features that distinguish our model from models of dynamic political games in which the
rules are clearly "known" to the players.
Our paper shares some features with studies on dynamic political decision-making. In particular,
our assumption that voters are farsighted in a "conservative" manner is closely related to previous
works by Harsanyi (1974), Greenberg (1990), Chwe (1994), Xue (1998), Chakravorti (1999), and
Ray and Vohra (2014).3 Like our study, most of these studies also assume ordinal preferences.4 A
3A conservative behavior is a behavior that ensures that the voter will never regret his current decision to support
change. As remarked by Ray and Vohra (2014), it is a leading standard of behavior in the literature.
4An alternative approach to modelling preferences would have been to assume that each voter receives a payo¤
at each stage of the dynamic game, and adds discounted payo¤s over time to obtain his total payo¤. But such an
approach is not meaningful within our framework because, for this to be feasible, voters should anticipate the exact
probability with which a leader will retain power after losing a future election. This probability is not known, as in
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distinctive feature of our framework, however, is that a transition from one stage of the political
game to another stage can be resisted even if it is supported by a winning coalition, as an incumbent
has the ability to steal the election. Such imperfections a¤ect votersrational behavior, as they
care not only about their long-term payo¤, but also about their immediate payo¤ when deciding to
support a challenger against the status quo. The aforementioned studies assume that individuals
receive their payo¤s only after the dynamic process has reached a stable outcome, which implicitly
assumes, as remarked by Acemoglu et al. (2012), that voters are su¢ ciently patient. Our model
of rationality is therefore di¤erent, which also implies that our set of equilibrium outcomes di¤ers
from those previously dened in the literature. Indeed, the solution concept introduced by our
analysis is new.
Our assumption that, in each election, the challenger is exogenously chosen from the set of
candidates in the opposition has been made in a number of studies. Penn (2009), for instance,
argues that, in real-life politics, citizens rarely have any control over which policy will be chosen
to be pitted against the status quo, in part due to the fact that a number of the complex factors
that govern elections are not under the control of voters. In her view, this argument makes the
exogeneity assumption realistic. Our scope however di¤ers from that of Penn in that we are
interested in imperfect democracy.
Like our paper, a few other papers have found that certain equilibrium outcomes in dynamic
collective decision making may be ine¢ cient (see, e.g., Pongou et al. (2008), Acemoglu et al.
(2012)). Our scopes and analyses, however, are di¤erent. Pongou et al. (2008) analyze the e¤ect
of binding solidarity agreements on outcome e¢ ciency in a political game that lasts at most two
periods. Unlike this study, we do not assume that voters cooperate. Acemoglu et al. (2012) analyze
collective decision-making in a context in which current decisions determine the future distribution
of political power and therefore inuence future decisions. In their framework, the competing alter-
natives are the constitutions. It follows that a constitution that is valid today may be changed to an
alternative constitution in the future by a population subgroup that is su¢ ciently powerful under
the current constitution. Our analysis is di¤erent. Within our framework, the competing alterna-
tives are politicians, and they compete for political power under a constitution that is xed over
time. We are also interested in a di¤erent question. We analyze political competition and stability
in a context of fraudulent democracy. Also, we study the conditions under which stable leaders
are e¢ cient. We show that ine¢ ciency is possible only when the number of competing politicians
is greater than four. We also provide a full characterization of the constitutional arrangements
that rule out ine¢ ciency, showing that, if the number of competing politicians is greater than four,
e¢ ciency at any preference prole is guaranteed if and only if the prevailing political system is
an oligarchy. Furthermore, we identify a large class of preferences for which equilibrium leaders
are always e¢ cient and popular regardless of the level of political competition. To the best of our
knowledge, these analyses and results are new.
real-life politics, it would depend on factors which are likely to vary over time and which cannot be fully anticipated
by ordinary citizens.
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3 A Fraudulent Dynamic Political Economy
A political economy is a society, N = f1; 2; :::; ng, populated by a nite number of individuals, and
endowed with a constitution, C, and a set of political leaders, A. Each individual has preferences
over leaders. We assume that elections are held at regular intervals and that in each election, an
opposition leader is pitted against the incumbent leader. If the incumbent wins, he retains power,
which makes him the status quo leader of the next election. But if he loses, the election is stolen
with an exogenously positive probability. We fully dene these notions as well as the fraudulent
dynamic electoral process below.
3.1 Political Leaders
A political leader is an individual who might run the society. We assume that there is a nite number
of competing political leaders, and that there are at least two leaders. In a society organized around
ethnic groups, for example, the number of leaders might reect the number of these groups. Each
leader promotes a distinct political platform, and his goal is to gain access to political power in
order to implement his political program.
3.2 Constitution
A constitution or a political rule is a distribution of political decision-making power among the
various subgroups of the society. It is formalized as a function C which maps each subgroup S of
the society into either 1 or 0; C(S) = 1 means that the members of S have the power to change the
status quo to a new social alternative (with a positive probability)5; and C(S) = 0 means that S
does not have such a power. Denote by 2N the set of all the subsets of N , and by W the set of all
the elements of 2N such that C(S) = 1. We assume that W is non-empty. In addition, we impose
the following natural conditions on W .
1. For any subgroups S and T such that S  T , if S 2W , then T 2W .
2. For any subgroup S, if S 2W , then N n S =2W .
Each subgroup in W is called a majority or a winning coalition. Condition (1) means that the
enlargement of a winning coalition of voters by adding new members results in another winning
coalition. Condition (2) means that the complementary set of a winning coalition is a losing
coalition. This condition prevents trivial political instability by avoiding situations in which two
non-overlapping winning coalitions have entirely opposing views on how the society should be run.
We say that a winning coalition S is minimal if any proper subset of S is a losing coalition.
In other words, a winning coalition is minimal if the coalition that results after one individual
withdraws from it is losing. We denote by Wm(C) (or simply Wm) the set of all minimal winning
coalitions under a constitution C.
5As is made clear in Section 3.4, this precision is important because a transition from an incumbent leader to a
challenger might be resisted even if it is supported by a coalition S such that C(S) = 1.
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Certain familiar constitutions will attract our attention in the paper. These constitutions in-
clude the majority rule, which is a rule under which a coalition of individuals is winning if and only
if it contains more than half of the population. Dasgupta and Maskin (2008) show that the major-
ity rule has some very appealing properties, making it the most democratic of all rules. Another
constitutional structure that is of special interest is the oligarchy, which is a political rule under
which there exists only one minimal winning coalition. If this unique coalition contains only one
individual, then the oligarchy is a dictatorship. If, on the other hand, it contains the entire popula-
tion, then the oligarchy is the unanimity rule. A typical oligarchy contains only a few members of
the society, and therefore it is neither a case of dictatorship, nor a case of unanimity rule. However,
we do not restrict our denition of an oligarchy to those more typical cases.
3.3 Preferences
Each individual i 2 N has a preference relation represented by a binary relation i on the set of
political leaders A. We assume that each preference relation i is:
 reexive: for any x 2 A, x <i x;
 transitive: for any x; y; z 2 A, if x <i y and y <i z, then x <i z; and
 complete: for any x; y 2 A, x <i y or y <i x or both.
The asymmetric and symmetric components of a preference relation i, denoted respectively
by i and i, are dened as follows:
 For any x; y 2 A; x i y if x <i y and not(y <i x); and
 For any x; y 2 A; x i y if x <i y and y <i x.
We will also sometimes assume that each preference relation i is:
 anti-symmetric: for any x; y 2 A, x <i y and y <i x imply x = y.
A preference relation that is reexive, transitive, antisymmetric, and complete is said to be a
linear order, and a preference relation that is reexive, transitive, and complete is said to be a weak
order. We denote the set of linear orders on A by L, and the set of weak orders on A by U . A
preference prole is denoted by (<i)i2N . Where there is no confusion, (<i)i2N will be denoted by
(<i). We denote by LN the set of all the preference proles of linear orders on A, and by UN the
set of all the preference proles of weak orders on A.
If S is a population subgroup and x and y are two political leaders, we say that S strictly prefers
x over y, denoted by x S y, if each individual in S strictly prefers x over y (that is, x i y for
every i 2 S). Similarly, we say that S prefers x over y, denoted as x <S y, if each individual in S
prefers x over y (that is, x <i y for every i 2 S).
If B  A is a subset of political leaders, then we denote by (<i jB) the restriction of (<i)i2N to
B. If B = An fxg where x 2 A, then (<i jB) is denoted by (<xi ).
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3.4 A Fraudulent Dynamic Electoral Competition
We assume that competition for power between political leaders takes place in a dynamic framework
under a xed constitution C as follows:
1. In period t = 0, nature chooses a political leader y to rule the society.
2. In period t = 1, an electoral contest is organized between the incumbent leader y and an
opposition leader x0 exogenously chosen from the set Anfyg.
(a) If y wins (which means that no majority coalition under C chooses x0 over y), he remains
in power and becomes the incumbent in the next election taking place in period t = 2.
(b) If y loses to x0, y steals the election (and retains power) with exogenous probability
p(x = y; t = 1)6, 0 < p < 1, and concedes defeat to x0 with probability 1  p.
3. In each period t  2, an electoral contest is organized between xt 1, the leader in power in
period t  1, and a leader yt exogenously chosen from the set Anfxt 1g, and the outcome is
decided as in stage 2.
The dynamic framework in which the winner of the current election becomes the status quo
(or incumbent) leader in the next election is classical (see, e.g., Harsanyi (1974), Chwe (1994), Xue
(1998), Penn (2011), Acemoglu et al. (2008), and Ray and Vohra (2014)). We adopt a similar
framework, though we di¤er in assuming that an incumbent leader who loses an election might
nonetheless retain power by stealing from the challenger. The probability with which electoral
fraud takes place cannot be determined in advance, as no individual or group is able to control all
the factors that make fraud a success or a failure. For instance, fraud might be prevented by an
active international community or by a revolt of citizens. However, it is not possible to predict
whether the international community will intervene or whether an internal revolt will take place
in the face of electoral fraud. For this reason, it is not possible to model individual utility by
adding discounted payo¤s over time to obtain a total payo¤, as this approach is feasible only if the
probability that a leader who is defeated in an election will retain power is known.
The assumption that, in each election, the challenger is exogenously chosen from the set of
opposition leaders has been made in several studies. In the literature, the main argument in
support of this exogeneity assumption is that, in real-life politics, voters rarely have any control
over the policies that are selected to challenge the status quo (see, e.g., Penn (2009)). Within
our framework, this assumption can be relaxed, though this relaxation will not change our main
conclusions. We retain it for simplicity and expository purposes.
6This probability may depend on the unobserved personal characteristics of the incumbent leader. It may also
vary over time depending on the internal and international political climate. It may also depend on the cost to the
leader of stealing an election. These factors are in general unknown in real-life politics. For these and other reasons,
the probability that a leader will steal an election is unknown.
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The assumption that nature chooses a political leader in period t = 0 is consistent with the
reality of many countries. In many African countries, for instance, the rst leader was not chosen
through a competitive electoral process, but instead by the former colonial power.
In a democracy, the constitution C that governs elections can be taken to be the majority rule.
However, we do not restrict ourselves to the majority rule as most of our results are valid under
any constitutional arrangement in the class of constitutions dened in Section 3.2.
4 Farsighted Behavior and the Farsighted Equilibrium Set
In this section, we model the behavior of voters within the dynamic framework described in Section
3.4. In each election, each voter chooses between the status quo leader and his challenger. Choosing
the challenger over the status quo leader is dictated by two basic rules:
1- The challenger should be preferred over the status quo.
2- Future political transitions following the replacement of the status quo leader by the challenger
should not possibly lead to a leader who is worse than the incumbent.
The rst rule follows from the fact that, if the challenger wins the current election and gains
access to power, he may retain power forever, even by stealing future elections. Therefore, a voter
who supports the challenger over the status quo leader should be motivated to do so. The second
rule incorporates the notion of farsightedness. In fact, if there is a possibility that supporting
the challenger would, following subsequent transitions, result in a leader who is worse than the
incumbent, then a voter should not support the challenger over the incumbent. This is again
because there is a possibility that the leader who would ultimately emerge would retain power
indenitely, even by manipulating future elections.
It follows that a voter within our framework is prudent or risk-averse, as his behavior rules out
the possibility that he will ever regret a current decision to support a challenger. Such a behavior is
described by Greenberg (1990) as being "conservative." As noted by Ray and Vohra (2014), it is a
leading standard of behavior, and has been adopted in several important studies on farsightedness.
Examples include Chwe (1994), Xue (1998), and Ray and Vohra (2014) among others.
We now formalize voter rational behavior. Let i be a voter. Denote by i the rationale by
which voter i decides to support or not to support a challenger x0 over an incumbent y. Following
the rst rule that guides the behavior of i, i will vote for x0 against y, which is denoted by x0 i y,
if x0 <i y. For x0 to win the election against y, a winning coalition S0 should vote for x0 against y,
which is denoted by x0 S y. If x0 gains access to power, he might, in a future election, be defeated
by another leader x1 supported by a winning coalition S1 (that is, x1 S1 x0). Furthermore, if x1
gains access to power, he might in turn be defeated by another competing leader x2 supported by
a winning coalition S2 (x2 S2 x1). The transition process will continue, possibly stabilizing at a
leader xp supported by a winning coalition Sp against leader xp 1 (xp 1 Sp xp). Such a transition
path is denoted by [(y; x0; x1; x2; :::; xp); (S0; S1; S2; :::; Sp)]. Our individual i who contributed to
the defeat of y for x0 knows that if the transition process reaches any leader xt (0  t  p) along
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the transition path [(y; x0; x1; x2; :::; xp); (S0; S1; S2; :::; Sp)], it might stop, as there is a positive
probability that xt will stay in power forever even by manipulating elections. The second rule that
guides the behavior of i implies that i should weakly prefer any such leader xt over the current
status quo y. In general, the two basic rules that guide a voters behavior imply that each member
of a winning coalition St (0  t  p) who initiates the (possible) transition from xt 1 to xt (where
y = x 1) should weakly prefer each of the leaders xr (t  r  p) along the future transition path
over xt 1 (that is, xr <St xt 1); he should also strictly prefers the leader xp over xt 1 (that is,
xr St xp) if the process is to be stabilized at xp if reached (the process stabilizes at xp if reached
if xp will stay in power forever without stealing elections; in other words, if xp is reached, there
will be no winning coalition following the rationale  that will be willing to replace xp by another
leader).
The denition of a transition path is formalized below.
Denition 1 Let   = (N;W;A; (<i)i2N ) be a political economy.
A transition path is a path [(y; x0; x1; x2; :::; xp); (S0; S1; S2; :::; Sp)] where y; x; x1; x2, ..., xp
are distinct political leaders and S0; S1; :::; Sp are winning coalitions satisfying:
1. x0 = x and x <S0 y;
2. 8t 2 f1; 2; :::; pg;8r 2 ft; t+ 1; :::; pg; xr <St xt 1;
3. xp St xt 1 for all t 2 f1; 2; :::; pg.
Such a path will be referred to as a (y; x)-path. It is said to be protable for S = S0 (or to be
S-rational) if xp S y.
Any (y; x)-path [(y; x0; x1; x2; :::; xp); (S0; S1; S2; :::; Sp)] such that not(xp <S y) is said to be
deterred.
The following denition introduces the farsighted equilibrium set, which is the set of leaders
who do not need to steal elections in order to remain in power.
Denition 2 Let   = (N;W;A; (<i)i2N ) be a political economy, S a winning coalition, and y and
x two political leaders.
1. x defeats y thanks to S, denoted xS y, if:
 There exits an S-rational (y; x)-path [(y; x; x1; x2; :::; xp); (S; S1; S2; :::; Sp)];
 Any (y; x)-path [(y; x; z1; z2; :::; zq); (S; T1; T2; :::; Tq)] satises zq <S y; in other words,
no such path is deterred.
2. y is defeated if there exist a leader x and a winning coalition S such that x defeats y thanks
to S.
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3. The set of undefeated leaders, also called the farsighted equilibrium set, is denoted Un( ).
We illustrate the farsighted equilibrium set through the following simple example.
Example 1 Consider a political economy   = (N;W;A; (<i)i2N ) where: N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g,
A = fa; b; c; dg, W = fS  N : I = 135  S; J = 126  S; or K = 234  Sg, and (<i)i2N is the
prole of preferences dened as follows: c 1 b 1 a 1 d, a 2 d 2 c 2 b, d 3 b 3 c 3 a,
b 4 d 4 c 4 a, b 5 c 5 a 5 d, c 6 a 6 d 6 b.
The popularity relationship7 among the di¤erent leaders is depicted by the following graph:
If d is the status quo leader, he will stay in power forever without stealing elections since no
winning coalition exists for change. It follows that d is an equilibrium leader.
If c is the status quo leader, then winning coalition K will vote for d if the latter is chosen as
the challenger, since the members of K prefer d over c and are aware of the fact that if d becomes
the new leader, he will stay forever. Thus, c is not an equilibrium leader since, in order to remain
in power, he will need to steal the election whenever he is opposed to d.
If the status quo leader is b, no winning coalition will be willing to support an alternative leader.
In fact, even though the members of the winning coalition J prefer c over b, some of them will not
support c over b if c is chosen to challenge b; voter 1, for instance, knows that, if c defeats b and
becomes the new leader, he will lose a future election against d, and so there is a positive probability
that a transition from c to d (the worst option of 1) will occur, which precludes 1 from joining J to
defeat b for c. It should therefore be noted that the stability of b is a result of the instability of c.
If a is the status quo leader, winning coalition I will support b if the latter is chosen as the
challenger, knowing that there will not be any further transition from b as b is an equilibrium
leader.
The farsighted equilibrium set is therefore Un( ) = fb; dg, which means that only leaders b and
d are able to remain in power without manipulating elections.
5 Existence of Equilibrium Leaders
In this section, we study the existence of equilibrium leaders. The following theorem shows that
an equilibrium leader always exists if preferences are linear.
7We say that a leader x is more popular than another leader y if x is preferred over y by a winning coalition. The
formal denition of this notion is given in Section 6.
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Theorem 1 Let   = (N;W;A; (<i)i2N ) be a political economy in which individual preferences are
linear orders. Then, Un( ) 6= ;.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that there exists a political economy   = (N;W;A; (<i)i2N ) with
(<i)i2N 2 LN for which Un( ) = ;. Since A is nite, the binary relation  has a cycle. Then
there exists a sequence of leaders (x1; x2; :::; xq; xq+1) such that the xi are distinct except xq+1 = x1
and for all t = 1; 2; :::; q, xt+1 defeats xt (i.e., xt+1  xt). Let St+1, t 2 f1; 2; :::; qg, be the winning
coalition that induces the transition from xt to xt+1, with Sq+1 = S1. Given that (<i)i2N is a
prole of linear orders, it holds that x1 S1 xq Sq ::: S3 x2 S2 x1. Let us now show that
xq S2 x1. In order to do so, we prove by induction that for all t 2 f2; 3; :::q   1g, xq St xt 1.
The result is obvious for t = q   1.
Consider t 2 f3; :::q   1g such that xq St xt 1. Consider the path [(xt 2; xt 1; xq); (St 1; St)].
We have xq <St 1 xt 1 because xt 1 defeats xt 2 thanks to St 1. Since preferences are linear
orders, xq <St 1 xt 1 is equivalent to xq St 1 xt 1.
We have just proved that for all t 2 f2; 3; :::q 1g, xq St xt 1; taking, for example, t = 2 yields
xq S2 x1. Furthermore, we have x1 S1 xq. Given that S1 and S2 are winning coalitions, both
coalitions share a voter who therefore strictly prefers x1 over xq and xq over x1, a contradiction. It
follows that, for all political economy   = (N;W;A; (<i)i2N ) in which (<i)i2N 2 LN , Un( ) 6= ;.
According to Theorem 1, a leader who would remain in power indenitely without stealing
elections always exists if citizens have linear preferences. This is a nice property for the class of
political economies we are analyzing, as this ensures that the society will not experience a situation
of complete destabilization. However, stability is not the only criterium on which to judge a
society. The quality of its ruling leaders also matters. Quality can be measured by whether a
leader is popular and/or e¢ cient. The question now is whether all equilibrium leaders are e¢ cient
and/or popular. In Example 1, for example, we saw that an unpopular leader can be stable, which
is a bad property. In the next section, we will also see that an equilibrium leader can be ine¢ cient,
which is another bad property. What are then the conditions that guarantee that a stable leader is
e¢ cient and/or popular? The goal of the next section is precisely to answer this crucial question.
6 Welfare Properties and Popularity of Equilibrium Leaders
In this section, we examine the welfare properties and popularity of equilibrium leaders. We show
that an equilibrium leader may be Pareto ine¢ cient, and that equilibrium leaders are unpopular
in general. We also investigate the conditions under which equilibrium leaders are Pareto e¢ cient
and/or popular. The formal denitions of the notions of Pareto e¢ ciency and popularity are given
below.
Denition 3 Let   = (N;W;A; (<i)i2N ) be a political economy, and a and b two political leaders.
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(i) b is said to Pareto-dominate a if all the voters strictly prefer b over a, denoted by b N a.
A Pareto-dominated leader is also said to be Pareto ine¢ cient.
(ii) a is said to be Pareto e¢ cient if no leader Pareto-dominates a.
(iii) a is said to be unpopular if he is less preferred than another leader, say c, by a constitutional
majority S 2W (that is, c S a). The set of leaders who are not unpopular is denoted by C( ).8
In order to show that equilibrium leaders may be ine¢ cient and unpopular, consider the fol-
lowing simple example.
Example 2 Consider a political economy   = (N;W;A; (<i)i2N ) where: N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7g,
A = fa; b; c; d; eg, W is the majority rule (a coalition S is winning if and only if jSj  4), and (<i
)i2N is the prole of preferences dened as follows: d 1 b 1 e 1 a 1 c, d 2 b 2 a 2 e 2 c,
d 3 b 3 a 3 e 3 c, e 4 d 4 c 4 b 4 a, c 5 b 5 a 5 e 5 d, c 6 b 6 a 6 e 6 d,
c 7 b 7 a 7 e 7 d. Let L = f2; 3; 5; 6g, S = f4; 5; 6; 7g, T = f1; 2; 3; 4g, and U = f1; 2; 3; 5g.
The popularity relationship among the leaders is depicted by the following graph.
We now identify the equilibrium leaders.
- If a is the status quo leader, he will not be defeated by b, even though the entire population
strictly prefers b over a. Indeed, assume by contradiction that a is defeated by b thanks to a coalition
S. Since jSj  4, then either S \ f1; 2; 3g 6= ; or S \ f5; 6; 7g 6= ;. If S \ f1; 2; 3g 6= ;, then we
obtain a contradiction because c 4567 b but not(c S a) (every member of 123 prefers a to c). If
S \ f5; 6; 7g 6= ;, then we obtain another contradiction because d 1234 b but not(d S a).
-Neither does c defeat a. Indeed, if c defeats a, it is only thanks to the support of the coalition
f4; 5; 6; 7g. This is clearly impossible because d 1234 c and a 567 d.
- Likewise, d does not defeat a.
It follows that a 2 Un( ). It can also be veried that b, c and d are not defeated either. Hence,
Un( ) = fa; b; c; d; eg.
We emphasize that, in Example 2, even though a is an equilibrium leader, he is unpopular and
Pareto ine¢ cient. This implies that ine¢ cient leaders can arise and persist in power forever. We
also remark that all leaders are unpopular in Example 2. This implies that, even though stable
8The popularity relation is a very popular notion in the literature, and the set C( ) is also known as the equilibrium
set of  .
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leaders exist in this economy, the society is not satised with any of them. In the next section, we
will see that such a situation is partially caused by a plethora of competing leaders. In general, we
will investigate the conditions under which such a situation can be avoided.
6.1 Welfare Properties of Equilibrium Leaders
We now seek to investigate the conditions under which equilibrium leaders are Pareto e¢ cient. A
few preliminary results are needed (Lemmas 1-2). The rst states that, if one excludes from a
political economy a leader who is Pareto-dominated by all the other leaders, that will not change
its set of equilibrium leaders.
Lemma 1 Let   = (N;W;A; (<i)i2N ) be a political economy in which individual preferences are
weak orders, and y 2 A a political leader. Let  y = (N;W;An fyg ; (<y)) be the political economy
resulting from the exclusion of y. Suppose that x N y for all x 2 An fyg. Then,
(i) y =2 Un( ); and
(ii) Un( ) = Un( y).
Proof. Suppose that x N y for all x 2 An fyg.
(i) Consider any x 2 An fyg. Then [(x; y) ;N ] is an N -rational (x; y)-path. Let
[(y; x0; x1; x2; :::; xp); (S0; S1; S2; :::; Sp)] be a (y; x)-path with S0 = N and x0 = x. By denition
of a (x; y)-path, xp 6= y and therefore xp N y. Such a (y; x)-path is not deterred. Thus x defeats
y thanks to N and y =2 Un( ).
(ii) Let z 2 Un( ). Since y =2 Un( ), it follows that z 2 An fyg. Recall that <yi is the restriction
of <i on An fyg. Thus z is still undefeated in  y and z 2 Un ( y). Conversely, let z 2 Un ( y).
Consider x 2 An fz; yg and S 2 W . Given a (y; x)-path [(z; x0; x1; x2; :::; xp); (S0; S1; S2; :::; Sp)] in
  with S0 = S and x0 = x, note that x0 = x <S y and, for each t 2 f1; 2; :::; pg, xt <S xt 1. Thus,
fx0; x1; x2; :::; xpg  An fyg and
[(z; x0; x1; x2; :::; xp); (S0; S1; S2; :::; Sp)] is also a (y; x)-path in  y. Therefore, z is undefeated
in  , otherwise z will also be defeated in  y; which is a contradiction. In other words, we have
z 2 Un ( ) and hence Un ( ) = Un ( y).
Our second preliminary result gives an equivalent denition of the farsighted rationale .
Lemma 2 Let   = (N;W;A; (<i)i2N ) be a political economy in which individual preferences are
weak orders, x; y 2 A two political leaders, and S 2 W a winning coalition. Then, x S y if and
only if: (i) x <S y; (ii) x S y or (z  x and z S y) for some z 2 A; and (iii) for all z 2 A,
z <S y holds whenever z  x.
Proof. Let   = (N;W;A; (<i)i2N ) be a political economy in which individual preferences are weak
orders, x; y 2 A two political leaders, and S 2 W a winning coalition. Assume that x defeats y
thanks to S, that is, xS y. Then   admits an S-rational (y; x)-path
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[(y; x0; x1; x2; :::; xp); (S0; S1; S2; :::; Sp)]. (i) Clearly S0 = S and x <S y by the denition of a
(y; x)-path. (ii) Note that if p = 0, then x S y. If p  1, we have z S1 x and z S y for
z = xp. (iii) Let z 2 A such that z  x. Then there exists T 2 W such that z T x. Therefore
[(y; x; z); (S; T )] is a (y; x)-path and since x defeats y thanks to S, z <S y obtains.
Conversely, assume that: (i) x <S y; (ii) x S y or (z  x and z S y) for some z 2 A; and
(iii) for all z 2 A for which z  x, z <S y. We rst prove that   admits an S-rational (y; x)-path.
If x S y, then [(y; x);S] is an S-rational (y; x)-path. Otherwise, there exists z 2 A such that
z  x and z S y. Then z T x for some T 2 W . Since, by assumption, x <S y, it follows that
[(y; x; z); (S; T )] is an S-rational (y; x)-path. In both cases,   admits an S-rational (y; x)-path.
Now we prove that   does not admit a deterred (y; x)-path. Consider any (y; x)-path
[(y; x0; x1; x2; :::; xp); (S0; S1; S2; :::; Sp)] with S0 = S and x0 = x. If p = 0, then by denition,
x S y. Otherwise xp S1 x, and by assumption, xp <S y. In both cases, this path is not deterred.
In conclusion, x defeats y thanks to S.
The following result is an immediate consequence of Lemma 2.
Corollary 1 Let   = (N;W;A; (<i)i2N ) be a political economy, x; y 2 A two political leaders, and
S 2W a winning coalition.
1. If individual preferences are weak orders and x S y, then xS y if and only if for all z 2 A,
z <S y holds whenever z  x.
2. If individual preferences are linear orders, then x S y if and only if x S y and for all
z 2 A, z S y holds whenever z  x.
The following result provides a su¢ cient condition for each equilibrium leader to be Pareto
e¢ cient. It states that if the number of competing leaders is not greater than four, then every
equilibrium leader is Pareto e¢ cient.
Proposition 1 Let   = (N;W;A; (<i)i2N ) be a political economy in which individual preferences
are weak orders. If jAj  4, then every equilibrium leader x 2 Un( ) is Pareto e¢ cient.
Proof. It is su¢ cient to prove that if two leaders x and y are such that x N y, then y =2 Un( ).
Let x and y be two leaders. Suppose that x N y.
First assume that jAj = 3 and let A = fx; y; ug. If u  x, then there exists S 2 W such that
u S x. By transitivity of individual preferences, it holds that u S y. Since NnS =2 W , neither
x  u nor y  u holds. Therefore u S x and u S y. It follows that y =2 Un( ). If not (u  x),
then neither u  x nor y  x holds. Therefore xN y and thus y =2 Un( ).
Now assume that jAj = 4 and let A = fx; y; u; vg.
Let us remark that given two political leaders a and b, if a L b and not(a L b), then there
exists another political leader c such that c  a.
Now let us consider the following four possible cases:
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(i) Suppose that not (u  x) and not (v  x). By the remark above, xN y.
(ii) Suppose that u S x for some S 2W and not (v  x). Note that u S y holds by transivity.
By Lemma 2, xS y.
(iii) Suppose that v S x for some S 2W and not (u  x). Clearly as in case (ii), xS y.
(iv) Suppose that u S x and v T x for some S; T 2 W . Note that u S y and v T y hold
by transitivity.
 If not (u  v), then not (z  v) for all z 2 An fvg, and by the remark above, v T y.
 If u  v, then not (z  u) for all z 2 An fug. Clearly, uS y.
In each of these four cases, y is defeated and hence, y =2 Un( ).
The following result provides another su¢ cient condition for equilibrium leaders to be Pareto
e¢ cient. It states that, under an oligarchic constitution, all equilibrium leaders are Pareto e¢ cient.
Proposition 2 Let   = (N;W;A; (<i)i2N ) be a political economy in which individual preferences
are weak orders. If W is an oligarchy, then every equilibrium leader x 2 Un( ) is Pareto e¢ cient.
Proof. Assume that there exists a unique minimal winning coalition S in W . Let x and y be two
political leaders such that x N y. The relation x S y obviously holds. Let z 2 A be a political
leader and suppose that z  x. Then z T x for some T 2 W . By the fact that S is the unique
minimal winning coalition, S  T , and thus z S y. By Lemma 2, xS y, and hence y =2 Un( ).
The next result shows that an equilibrium leader may be ine¢ cient if the constitution is non-
oligarchic and there are ve competing leaders.
Proposition 3 Let N be a society endowed with a non-oligarchic constitution W and a set of ve
competing political leaders A. There exists a linear preference prole (<i)i2N such that the political
economy   = (N;W;A; (<i)i2N ) contains a Pareto ine¢ cient equilibrium leader.
Proof. LetN be a society under a non-oligarchic constitutionW . Assume thatA = fa1; a2; a3; a4; a5g.
Since W is not an oligarchy, there exist at least two distinct minimal winning coalitions S1 and S2.
Note that S1 \ S2 6= ; (S2 is the complementary set of the set S2) and S2 \ S1 6= ; as S1 and S2
are minimal winning coalitions. For any i 2 N , dene <i as follows :
a5 i a4 i a3 i a2 i a1 if i 2 S1 \ S2
a4 i a2 i a1 i a5 i a3 if i 2 S1 \ S2
a3 i a2 i a1 i a5 i a4 if i 2 S1
17
We have a2 N a1. To prove that a1 2 Un ( ), we show that for each aj 2 fa2; a3; a4; a5g, a1
is not defeated by aj (that is, not(aj  a1)).
Case aj = a5. First note that fi 2 N : a5 i a1g = S1\S2. But S1 and S2 are distinct minimal
winning coalitions. Then S1 \ S2 =2W . Therefore, by Lemma 2, a1 is not defeated by aj .
Case aj = a4. First observe that fi 2 N : a4 i a1g = S1. Now suppose there exists S 2 W
such that a4 S a1. Then S  S1. But S1 is a minimal winning coalition. Thus S = S1. Since
S1 \ S2 6= ;, a5 S2 a4 and a1 S1\S2 a5, then by Lemma 2, a5 does not defeats a1 thanks to
S = S1.
Case aj = a3. Note that fi 2 N : a3 i a1g = (S1 \ S2)[S1. Suppose there exists S 2W such
that a3 S a1. Then S  (S1 \ S2) [ S1. But S1 is a minimal winning coalition. Thus S \ S1 6= ;;
otherwise S  S1 \ S2 yields a contradiction. Since S \ S1 6= ;, a4 S1 a3 and a1 S\S1 a4, by
Lemma 2, a3 does not defeat a1 thanks to S.
Case aj = a2. Let S 2W . Then S can be rewritten as:
S = (S \ S1 \ S2) [
 
S \ S1 \ S2
 [  S \ S1
Therefore S \ S1 \ S2 6= ; or S \ S1 6= ; holds; otherwise S  S1 \ S2 yields a contradiction. If
S \ S1 \ S2 6= ;, then a2 does not defeat a1 thanks to S since a3 S2 a2 and a1 S\S1\S2 a3. If
S \ S1 6= ;, then a2 does not defeat a1 thanks to S since a4 S1 a2 and a1 S1\S2 a4. In both
situations, a2 does not defeat a1 thanks to S.
In summary, a1 is Pareto-dominated and a1 2 Un( ).
Our second main result provides a complete characterization of political economies for which
equilibrium leaders are always Pareto e¢ cient. It states that all equilibrium leaders are Pareto
e¢ cient under any constitution if and only if the economy has at most four competing political
leaders. However, if there are more than four competing political leaders, all equilibrium leaders
are Pareto e¢ cient if and only if the constitution is oligarchic.
Theorem 2 Let N be a society endowed with a constitution W . The following two assertions are
equivalent:
1) For all political economy   = (N;W;A; (<i)i2N ) where the preferences (<i)i2N are weak
orders, every equilibrium leader x 2 Un( ) is Pareto e¢ cient.
2) W is oligarchic or jAj  4.
Proof. Suppose that for all political economy   = (N;W;A; (<i)i2N ), every x 2 Un( ) is Pareto ef-
cient. Suppose that jAj  5 and let A = A1[A2 with A1 = fa1; a2; a3; a4; a5g, A2 = fa6; a7; :::; amg
and A1 \A2 = ;. Suppose that W is not oligarchic. Then by Proposition 3, there exists a political
economy  0 = (N;A1;W; (<0)) such that a1 is Pareto-dominated and a1 2 Un ( 0). Now consider
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a political economy   = (N;W;A; (<i)i2N ) where the prole (<) is such that for all i 2 N : (i)
the restriction of <i on A1 coincides with <0i; (ii) a i b for all a 2 A1 and b 2 A2; and (iii)
at 1 i at for all t 2 f5; 6; :::;mg. By Proposition 1, Un( ) = Un( 0) and thus a1 2 Un ( ). This
is a contradiction. Therefore W is oligarchic.
Conversely, suppose that W is oligarchic or jAj  4. If W is oligarchic, then by Proposition 2,
every x 2 Un( ) is Pareto e¢ cient. If jAj  4, then by Proposition 1, every x 2 Un( ) is Pareto
e¢ cient, which completes our proof.
The nding that an oligarchy always induces an ine¢ cient leader is not very hard to imagine.
However, the nding that the limitation of the number of competing politicians to a maximum of
four ensures that all the equilibrium leaders are e¢ cient was unexpected. It therefore deserves an
explanation. The intuition underlying this result is that a greater number of competing politicians
creates more uncertainty about who will govern the society in the future if the current ruling
leader loses power. As shown in Example 2, this uncertainty might sometimes combine with voter
prudence or forward-looking behavior to maintain the current leader in power, even if he or she is
ine¢ cient. Our ndings therefore show that an excessively high level of political competition is not
necessarily desirable, as it might lead to political failure or ine¢ ciency. Our analysis has identied
the minimum level of political competition that is necessary to lead to this situation, and therefore
has practical implications for the level of compromise that political leaders should achieve in order
to rescue their citizens from an eventually bad and persistent equilibrium. Political competition is
clearly desirable, but our analysis implies that there should be no more than four political parties.
This implies that political leaders should strive to form coalitions, especially in highly fragmented
societies where the number of competing political leaders generally reects the number of factions.
6.2 Popularity of Equilibrium Leaders
In Example 2, we saw that equilibrium leaders may be unpopular and ine¢ cient. The requirement
that an equilibrium leader be popular is more stringent than the requirement that he be Pareto
e¢ cient. In fact, Pareto ine¢ cient leaders are always unpopular by denition, but an unpopular
leader is not always Pareto ine¢ cient. In this section, we provide a su¢ cient condition on pref-
erences for equilibrium leaders to not be unpopular. We nd that, if the popularity relation  is
transitive, then all equilibrium leaders are popular and hence Pareto e¢ cient, and each popular
leader is an equilibrium.
Theorem 3 Let   = (N;W;A; (<i)i2N ) be a political economy in which individual preferences are
weak orders. If the popularity relation  is transitive, then every equilibrium leader x 2 Un ( ) is
popular and hence Pareto e¢ cient, and every popular leader x 2 C ( ) is an equilibrium leader:
Un ( ) = C ( ).
Proof. Note that by Lemma 2, C ( )  Un ( ) for any political economy  . Now let   =
(N;W;A; (<i)i2N ) be a political economy. Suppose that  is transitive. Assume an equilibrium
leader y 2 Un ( ) and suppose that y =2 C ( ). Then t  y for some t 2 An fyg. In other words,
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y is not a maximal element of the relation . Since A is nite and the dominance relation  is
transitive, there exists a maximal element x for  such that x  y. Therefore there exists S 2 W
such that x S y. Since there is no z 2 An fxg such that z  x, then by Lemma 2, x defeats
y thanks to S. This is a contradiction since y 2 Un ( ). Thus C ( )  Un ( ). In conclusion,
C ( ) = Un ( ).
The popularity relation has been widely studied in the literature. The main focus has been
to uncover conditions on the structure of preferences under which this relation is transitive (see,
e.g., Sen (1966), Inada (1964, 1969), and Salles (1976)). In the class of constitutions considered
in this paper, Salles (1976) provides three conditions that, when taken disjunctively, are necessary
and su¢ cient for the popularity relation to be transitive. These conditions are value restriction
(VR), dichotomous preferences (DP), and cyclical dependence (CD) (see Theorems 1-4 in Salles
(1976)).9 The value-restriction property was identied by Sen (1966), the dichotomous-preferences
property was identied by Inada (1969), and the cyclical-dependence property was identied by
Salles (1976). Each of these properties identies a very wide class of preferences. Given the analysis
of Salles (1976), the following result immediately follows from Theorem 3.
Corollary 2 Let   = (N;W;A; (<i)i2N ) be a political economy in which preferences are weak
orders. If the preference prole (<i)i2N satises value restriction, the dichotomous-preferences
property, or cyclical dependence, then every equilibrium leader x 2 Un ( ) is popular, and every
popular leader x 2 C ( ) is an equilibrium leader: Un ( ) = C ( ).
Our analysis therefore identies a wide class of preferences for which every equilibrium leader
is popular and thus Pareto e¢ cient. In particular, it is well-known that the class of preference
proles that satisfy value restriction includes the popular class of single-peaked preference proles
identied by Black (1948), as well as the class of single-carved preference proles identied by Inada
(1964). It follows that when voters have single-peaked or single-carved preferences, not only does
an equilibrium leader exist, but all equilibrium leaders are popular are e¢ cient.
We also note that the class of preferences for which our set of equilibrium leaders coincides with
the set of popular leaders is in general larger than the class of preferences for which the popularity
relation is transitive. For example, consider the following political economy   = (N;W;A; (<i)i2N )
where N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g, W = fS  N : jSj  0:75 jN jg, t 1 y 1 x 1 z, t 2 x 2 z 2 y and
t i z i y i x for i 2 f3; 4; 5g. It can be easily veried that the popularity relation  is not
transitive, but that C( ) = Un( ) = ftg.
9A preference prole (<i)i2N is said to satisfy VR if, in any three-alternative subset fx; y; zg  A, there is an
alternative such that all concerned individuals for this subset agree that it is not the worst, or the best, or the
medium-ranked alternative (a concerned individual for a set X is an individual who is not indi¤erent between every
pair of elements in X). A preference prole (<i)i2N satises DP if, for any three-alternative subset fx; y; zg  A,
each individual is indi¤erent over some pair of alternatives fa; bg  fx; y; zg. A preference prole (<i)i2N satises
CD if, for any three-alternative subset fx; y; zg  A, if an individual i has preferences a i b i c, then there exist
no individuals j and k such that b j c j a and c <k a <k b, and there exist no individuals j0 and k0 such that
b j0 c j0 a and c k0 a k0 b, and there exist no individuals j00 and k00 such that b j00 c j00 a and c k00 a k00 b.
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7 Implications for the Majority Rule and Ethnic Societies
In this section, we draw some lessons about the majority rule from the analysis carried out thus far.
Our focus on the majority rule is justied by the fact that it is widely regarded as the fairest and the
most democratic of all political rules. Maskin and Dasgupta (2008) show that the simple majority
rule satises ve appealing properties (the Pareto property, neutrality, anonymity, decisiveness,
and independence of irrelevant alternatives) over a larger domain of preferences than any other
rule. The majority rule is also used to select policies in most societies. Therefore, deriving the
implications of our ndings for this rule is likely to shed light on some of the factors that determine
the longevity and quality of political leaders in these societies.
Under the majority rule, there always exists at least one equilibrium leader when preferences
are linear (Theorem 1). However, such a leader might be ine¢ cient and unpopular, as shown
in Example 2 for leader a. From Theorem 2, we also note that, under the majority rule, an
equilibrium leader will be e¢ cient at any preference prole if and only if there are at most four
competing leaders. This has implications for the quality and longevity of leaders in countries that
are organised around ethnic groups and in which the number of leaders often reects the number of
these groups. When such countries have several competing ethnic groups, our analysis implies that
they can be trapped under an ine¢ cient and hence unpopular leader who does not even need to
manipulate elections to retain political power. This result suggests another channel through which
more ethnically fragmented societies often have leaders who, despite being amazingly incompetent
and unpopular, persist in power for long periods even when elections are fair. A testable implication
implied by our analysis is therefore that, under the majority rule, ethnic fragmentation induces bad
economic policies by favoring the election of bad leaders.
8 Naiveté versus Farsightedness
Our analysis has clear implications for how voting behavior a¤ects political outcomes. In particular,
we contrast voting outcomes under farsighted behavior on the one hand and naive ormyopic behavior
on the other hand. Scholars have expressed doubt over whether agents are really farsighted when
making real-life economic decisions. In real-life politics, voters might view each election as a one-
shot game, voting as if the next election is an entirely di¤erent game. In this context, voters only
consider their immediate gains. How would the political outcome that results from such naive
behavior di¤er from the outcome generated by farsighted behavior?
If voters are naive, it is obvious that they will support the challenger over the status quo leader
whenever they prefer the former over the latter, thus destabilizing or ejecting the status quo leader
with a positive probability (based on the assumption that the incumbent might steal the election).
This implies that only popular leaders, if they gain power at some point, will be able to remain in
o¢ ce forever without stealing elections. In other words, the equilibrium set of a political economy
  is C( ) under naive voting behavior.
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We note that the set C( ) is included in the farsighted equilibrium set Un( ), which means
that a myopically stable leader is also a farsightedly stable leader. In addition, by denition,
each myopically stable leader is popular. This implies that myopically stable leaders in general
have more desirable properties than farsightedly stable leaders in that farsightedly stable leaders
who are not myopically stable are unpopular and possibly are ine¢ cient as well. In that sense,
myopically stable leaders are the rst-best for society, whereas leaders who are only farsightedly
stable are the second-best. Note however that the set C( ) may be empty as shown in Example 2,
which depicts a situation in which all farsightedly stable leaders are unpopular.
Our analysis implies that naive voting behavior is more likely to lead to leaders that are better
for the society than sophisticated behavior, which seems counterintuitive. However, naive behavior
might cause an individual to regret his political choice, whereas farsighted behavior, by denition,
prevents any such disappointment. It follows that individually optimal behavior is in general
detrimental to the society, whereas behavior that is optimal for the society might be detrimental to
the individuals who adopt it. However, as our characterization result obtained in Section 7 implies,
this dilemma is resolved for a large class of preferences which strictly includes the popular class
of single-peaked preferences, as naive and farsighted behaviors lead to the same set of equilibrium
leaders for this class.
9 Conclusions
We have proposed a tractable framework for studying political competition and stability in nomi-
nally democratic societies characterized by fraudulent elections. In these democracies, an incumbent
leader can retain power indenitely with a strictly positive probability by manipulating elections.
We have modeled the behavior of forward-looking citizens, thus dening a new solution concept.
An equilibrium leader is a leader who is able to remain in power forever without stealing elections.
We show that such a leader always exists when citizens have linear preferences. However, he may be
unpopular and ine¢ cient. We have uncovered three types of conditions under which an equilibrium
leader is never ine¢ cient. Two of these conditions clearly show that e¢ ciency is achieved at the
cost of restricting basic democratic principles, such as limiting the number of competing leaders to
four or distributing political rights in an inequitable manner. The third condition identies a wide
class of preferences for which equilibrium leaders are never ine¢ cient, with this class containing
the popular class of single-peaked preferences. We also have demonstrated that, under this class of
preferences, the set of equilibrium leaders coincides with the set of popular leaders, which was an
unexpected nding.
The analysis suggests a new testable channel through which a high level of ethnic fragmentation
can lead to underdevelopment. Societies that are highly fragmented along ethnic lines generally
have a large number of competing political leaders. Our analysis implies that this plethora of leaders
might lead to political failure by favoring the emergence of an ine¢ cient and hence unpopular leader
who is able to persist in power indenitely without needing to steal elections.
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The nding that the limitation of the number of competing politicians to a maximum of four
guarantees political e¢ ciency therefore has clear implications for the level of political compromise
that leaders should achieve in highly fragmented societies in order to prevent political failure. Even
though political competition is clearly desirable, our analysis suggests that there should only exist
a limited number of political parties, like, for instance, in the United States. A way to achieve a
smaller number of political parties could be to provide incentives for political leaders who are not
too distant ideologically to merge their political platforms. This could prevent the society from
being trapped under a bad equilibrium. An excessively large number of political leaders creates a
high level of uncertainty about who will govern the society in the future if the current ruling leader
loses power. This uncertainty sometimes combines with voter prudence to maintain the current
leader in power, even if he or she is ine¢ cient and hence highly unpopular. An excessively large
number of competing political leaders only helps to create a form of political inertia that only
benets the status quo leader, even when the latter should clearly be ejected from power.
We conclude by discussing a di¤erent application of our model. It might also be applied to study
the dynamic selection of sticky policies in fully developed democracies. Sticky policies are policies
that, once enacted, remain in force for an indenite period of time until they are voted out in favor
of new legislation. At the time that such policies are voted, lawyers and other analysts a priori
cannot foretell how long they will remain in e¤ect. Sticky policies are therefore characterized
by uncertainty about their durability. In general, such policies include, but are not limited to,
redistributive programs (e.g., scal policies, minimum-wage laws, and social-welfare programs),
health-care programs, land property rights, environmental policies, and eligibility requirements for
political participation and competition. There is no certainty over when an election will be organized
to challenge the extant policy. Even when there is enough political support for change, it is not
clear when the next election will take place as this often depends on the willingness of a political
leader to bring the issue to the attention of the public and the main political decision-makers. There
is a number of complex factors that a¤ect elections and that are not under the control of voters.
Sticky policies are therefore unlike political leadership which, in a fully functioning democracy, is
renewed on a regular basis through presidential, legislative or mayoral elections that take place at
regular intervals. When deciding to support change over the status quo, voters might behave as
if the new policy program, if chosen, will remain in place forever with a positive probability, just
like a new leader who retains power indenitely by manipulating elections. In this context, all our
results are valid. In particular, our analysis implies that an unpopular and ine¢ cient policy may
remain in place forever in fully democratic societies.
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